http://danielrm26.disqus.com/dmiessler.com/about/enFri, 27 Apr 2007 02:27:29 -0000http://dmiessler.com/blog/the-prisoners-dilemma-the-key-to-successful-civilization#comment-4353610<p>I would suggest that you read:<br>Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction<br>Peter C. Ordeshook <br>Published 1986, Cambridge University Press</p><p>End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach <br>Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker <br>University of Bonn, D-5300, Bonn 1, FRG</p><p>Prisoner's Dilemma <br>Anatol ( Rapoport <br>Contributor Albert M. Chammah <br>Published 1965 University of Michigan Press</p><p>And if you get time the last one:<br>Kreps and Wilson, 1982. D. Kreps and R. Wilson , Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), pp. 253–279. Abstract | Full Text Links | PDF (1664 K) | MathSciNet</p><p>Is most critical. The issue is that you require a system of determining reputation.<br>In general society, many events are not reported.</p><p>This also demonstrates a pattern where "players" will cooperate until shortly before the end of the "game". At this point, a deviation towards non-cooperative behaviour has been demonstrated as the most effective strategy.</p><p>Regards,<br>Craig</p>Craig S WrightFri, 27 Apr 2007 02:27:29 -0000